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INTRODUCTION
In the Winter of 1996, the Harvard Journal on Legislation published an
article entitled in part, The Last Article About the Language of ERISA
Preemption ?' Absent the question mark, one might have thought it a bold
(and hopefully accurate) statement. Yet, as the question mark suggests, no
scholar has been able to provide the definitive answer regarding the scope
of ERISA preemption. Indeed, only the Supreme Court can, and it has
answered with a resounding lack of clarity. Rather than shedding light on
the language of ERISA preemption, the Supreme Court in four recent
decisions has thrust the issue back into a murky darkness. So jurists,
academics, and practitioners alike, while perhaps not old friends, again
1. Catherine L. Fisk, The Last Article About the Language of ERISA Preemption? A Case
Study of the Failure of Textualism, 33 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 35 (1996).
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must talk about the darkness enveloping ERISA preemption.
Since enactment in 1974, the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act (ERISA)2 has confounded both state regulators and the courts
concerning the appropriate extent of its preemption of state law: Using an
odd turn of phrase, Congress sought to supersede state laws that "relate to
any employee benefit plan."3 On its face, this language appears to call for
a broad scope of preemption, and, for roughly two decades, the Court
agreed and interpreted the "relate to" standard so as to moot a myriad of
state laws touching on employee benefit plans.4
This expansive reading of ERISA preemption has come under
increasing criticism. In what has become a familiar refrain, commentators
point to ERISA's lack of substantive regulation of employee welfare
benefit plans as evidence of a Congressional intent to limit federal ouster
of state regulation.5 They point out that ERISA's silence, when coupled
with the preemption of state law, essentially results in a "regulatory
vacuum" concerning employee welfare benefit plans. Viewing this
vacuum as abhorrent, they presume that Congress must have intended a
greater role for state regulation. This criticism is perhaps most poignant
with respect to employer-provided health care benefits, which are among
the most significant and least regulated of all employee benefits.7
Perhaps responding to this criticism, the Supreme Court has issued four
decisions since 1995 that appear to signal a growing discomfort with
ERISA's broad preemptive sweep. These decisions, while raising the
potential for a radically altered landscape of employee benefits law, have
not been successful in crafting a new standard for testing ERISA's
preemptive scope.
The presumed Congressional silence in ERISA with respect to the
substantive regulation of employee benefit plans lies at the heart of this
debate. Is a more limited scope of ERISA preemption the inevitable
"sound" of this silence? We think not. A review of ERISA's legislative
2. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1974).
3. Id. § 1144(a).
4. See infra notes 45-58 and accompanying text.
5. See Fisk, supra note 1, at 36-37, 56; Daniel M. Fox & Daniel C. Schaffer, Semi-
Preemption in ERISA: Legislative Process and Health Policy, 7 AM. J. TAX PoIucy 47, 48 (1988);
Susan J. Stabile, Preemption of State Law by Federal Law: A Task for Congress or the Courts?,
40 VL. L. REv. 1, 31-35 (1995); see also Jay Conison, ERISA and the Language of Preemption,
72 WASH. U. L.Q. 619,667 (1994).
6. See, e.g., Fisk, supra note 1, at 37; Fox & Schaffer, supra note 5, at 48; Stabile, supra
note 5, at 35.
7. See, e.g., Corey J. Ayling, New Developments in ERISA Preemption and Judicial
Oversight of Managed Care, 31 CREIGHTON L. REv. 403, 434 (1998); Robert N. Covington,
Amending ERISA's Preemption Scheme, 8 KAN.J.L. &PUB.POL'Y 1 (1999); Fox & Schaffer, supra
note 5.
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history and post-enactment amendments suggests that this Congressional
silence was intentional and, more importantly, consistent in purpose with
the broad scope of preemption announced by the Court nearly two decades
ago. Rather than abhorring this vacuum, Congress deliberately established
a regulation-free zone largely devoid of both federal and state law
mandates. By creating this regulatory vacuum, Congress sought to free
employers from conflicting regulatory schemes and to encourage them to
expand the number of voluntarily provided benefit plans for their
employees. In short, Congressional silence regarding the substance of
welfare benefit plans should be viewed as inviting a "libertarian ethos" to
infuse the law and marketplace of employee benefits.
Thus, the shifting winds of ERISA preemption present both a curse and
an opportunity: a curse of unpredictability concerning the present standard
for preemption, and an opportunity to reinvestigate the appropriate balance
between state and federal regulation of employee benefits. As the struggle
to articulate a standard continues, the courts would be wise to recall
ERISA's libertarian ethos and refrain from treating the preemption issue
as a proxy for debating health care reform.
Part I of this article provides an introduction to basic federal
preemption principles, while Part II provides an overview of the ERISA
statute. Part IT then reviews the Supreme Court's ERISA preemption
jurisprudence, first in terms of the Court's traditionally broad interpretation
of the "relate to" standard, and then with regard to the more limiting
decisions issued since 1995. Part IV summarizes the various options
flowing from these decisions for a future preemption test as well as the
arguments of those commentators who recommend a more narrow scope
of ERISA preemption. In Part V, we investigate various indicators of
Congressional intent, such as legislative history, the structure and coverage
of ERISA, and post-enactment amendments, as a means of gauging the
appropriateness of a narrower preemption standard. This process, as we
discuss in Part VI, reveals the libertarian ethos underlying ERISA's
treatment of welfare benefit plans by which Congress sought to encourage
the development of benefit plans in an environment largely free of both
federal and state regulation. Given this overarching objective, we conclude
that a narrower scope of ERISA preemption is inconsistent with
Congressional intent and that the Court, accordingly, should fashion its
new analytical framework in a manner that will retain a broad preemptive
scope.
I. A PRIMER ON PREEMPTION
A federal system of government necessarily involves a tension in the
division of power between state and federal governments. Under the
United States Constitution, this tension is principally resolved through the
[Vol. 52
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Supremacy Clause, which states, 'This Constitution, and the laws of the
United States... shall be the supreme law of the Land."8 This language
authorizes, but does not compel, federal preemption of state law. Generally
speaking, federal law supersedes state law where the two laws conflict or
where Congress has otherwise indicated its desire to oust state regulation.9
Preemption analysis, therefore, is a matter of divining Congressional intent
with respect to the particular federal statute at issue. 0
The federal courts primarily bear the responsibility of determining
when federal preemption of state law is appropriate. The Supreme Court
first addressed the question of preemption in the landmark case of
McCulloch v. Maryland," which stated:
[T]he sovereignty of the State ... is subordinate to, and may
be controlled by the Constitution of the United States. How
far it has been controlled by that instrument must be a
question of construction. In making this construction, no
principle not declared, can be admissible, which would defeat
the legitimate operations of a supreme government. It is of the
very essence of supremacy to remove all obstacles to its
action within its own sphere, and so to modify every power
vested in subordinate governments, as to exempt its own
operations from their own influence. This effect need not be
stated in terms. It is so involved in the declaration of
supremacy, so necessarily implied in it, that the expression of
it could not make it more certain.1
2
Not long thereafter, in Gibbons v. Ogden, Justice Johnson noted in a
concurring opinion that certain state navigation laws, which conflicted with
those of Congress, were "repugnant to the... Constitution, and void."' 3 In
the years since, the Court has engaged in an evolving jurisprudence on
preemption. Since the Presidency of Franklin Delano Roosevelt and the
rapid expansion of federal laws into areas of traditional state power, the
issue of federal preemption has attained heightened importance.
The Supreme Court, through this evolvingjurisprudence, has identified
two functional categories of preemption: express and implied. 4 The court
8. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
9. See Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497,504 (1978).
10. See Stephen F. Befort, Demystifying Federal Labor and Employment Law Preemption,
13 THE LABOR LAWYER 429 (1998).
11. 17 U.S. (4Wheat.) 316 (1819).
12. Id. at 427.
13. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 240 (1824) (Johnson, J., concurring).
14. See, e.g., English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72 (1990). These preemption categories
are discussed in greater length in Karen A. Jordan, The Shifting Preemption Paradigm: Conceptual
and Interpretive Issues, 51 VAM. L. REV. 1149 (1998).
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uses express analysis to determine the effect of a direct statement within
a federal law describing the appropriate scope of federal preemption. In
other words, preemption is express when "Congress' command is
explicitly stated in the statute's language.... ."" Express preemption
clauses sometimes have been a cause of consternation, prompting one
commentator to suggest that Congress instead should leave preemption
issues to the judiciary. 6 Still, because the ultimate goal of preemption
analysis is to ascertain Congressional intent, an express statement serves
at least to assist the courts in determining that intent.
The courts employ implied preemption analysis when a statute lacks an
express provision articulating its preemptive impact. While the statute may
not directly call for preemption, Congressional "intent" may impliedly
suggest that state law should be preempted to further the purposes of the
federal law. 17 Implied preemption is generally of two types: field
preemption and conflict preemption. Field preemption arises when
Congress impliedly demonstrates its intent to reserve an area of concern
exclusively for federal regulation. The Supreme Court, for example, has
inferred such an intent from a "scheme of federal regulation . . . so
pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room
for the States to supplement it."18 As Justice Stone rightfully pointed out
with respect to field preemption, "[every] Act of Congress occupies some
field, but we must know the boundaries of that field before we can say that
it has precluded a state from the exercise of any power reserved to it by the
Constitution." 9 Justice Stone's remonstrance notwithstanding, once a court
has determined the boundaries of the field in question, federal law will oust
state law attempting to occupy that same field. This is true even if there is
no direct conflict between federal and state law, or indeed, even if federal
and state law are consistent.20
Conflict preemption necessarily is narrower in scope than field
preemption. A court will invalidate a state law on conflict preemption
grounds to the extent that a state law directly conflicts with federal law.
The Supreme Court has explained that conflict preemption will be found
when it is either "impossible for a private party to comply with both state
15. Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107 (1994).
16. See Stabile, supra note 5, at 3 (arguing that, "except in rare circumstances, Congress
should refrain from including express preemption provisions in the legislation it enacts, suggesting
that the courts, rather than Congress, are better able to make preemption determinations that give
appropriate regard to federalism considerations").
17. See Befort, supra note 10, at 429-30; Jordan, supra note 14, at 1165-66.
18. English, 496 U.S. at 79.
19. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52,78 (1941) (Stone, J., dissenting).
20. See Department of Indus., Labor & Human Relations v. Gould, Inc., 475 U.S. 282,286
(1986); Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., 486 U.S. 825, 829 (1988).
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and federal requirements" 21 or where state law stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the "full purposes and objectives of
Congress."'22 Under the latter inquiry, state law will pose an impermissible
obstacle if it "interferes with the methods by which the federal statute was
designed to reach [its] goal." 23
Whether preemption is express, field, or conflict in nature, the ultimate
effect is the same. To the extent that federal law is found to be preemptive,
a state is ousted from the power to regulate. Similarly, a plaintiff may not
impose liability on a defendant under state law, "regardless of whether the
defendant's conduct in fact constituted a violation of state law and
regardless of whether federal law provides the plaintiff any remedy."'24
From this brief overview, it is clear that courts must consider several
policy considerations in resolving questions of preemption, such as basic
notions of federalism, uniformity of laws, ease of administration, and
allocation of resources. 25 The tensions underlying these policy concerns
have been explored frequently in the Supreme Court's ERISA preemption
jurisprudence. Nonetheless, while the Supreme Court has visited the
question of preemption under ERISA at an average of almost once per year
since enactment,26 the scope of preemption still remains uncertain.
II. A BRmF INTRODUCTION TO ERISA
Prior to ERISA's adoption, relatively little legislation, either state or
federal, governed employee benefits. State law predominated in the form
of insurance regulation focused principally on issues of taxation and
fiduciary duties.27
With the enactment of ERISA in 1974, Congress crafted the first
comprehensive law governing employee benefits in the United States. The
findings and declaration of policy incorporated in ERISA reflect Congress'
views on the importance of this step.
The Congress finds... that the continued well being and
security of millions of employees and their dependents are
21. English, 496 U.S. at 79.
22. Id. (quoting Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725,747 (1981)).
23. IntemationalPaperCo. v. Quellette,479 U.S. 481,494 (1987) (addressingthepreemptive
effect of the Clean Water Act).
24. Stabile, supra note 5, at 5.
25. See id. at 9-12.
26. The Supreme Court has decided seventeen ERISA preemption cases since the statute was
enacted in 1974. See Unum Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 526 U.S. 358 (1999) (the Court's most recent
ERISA preemption decision); Prudential Ins. Co. v. National Park Med. Ctr., 154 F.3d 812, 815
(8th Cir. 1998) (listing sixteen ERISA preemption cases decided through 1998).
27. See generally Conison, supra note 5, at 642-45.
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directly affected by these plans; that they are affected with a
national public interest; that they have become an important
factor in activities of their participants, and the employers,
employee organizations, and other entities by which they are
established or maintained.... 28
Moreover, Congress clearly felt that the prior set of state and federal laws
governing employee benefits were inadequate: "[O]wing to the lack of
employee information and adequate safeguards concerning their operation,
it is desirable in the interests of employees and their beneficiaries that
disclosure be made and safeguards be provided with respect to the
establishment, operation, and administration of such plans .... "2 9
Although commonly thought of as a law regulating pensions, ERISA
is a set of statutes30 that regulates benefit programs for current employees
as well as for retired employees. Thus, benefit plans subject to ERISA
include both "pension"' plans and "employee welfare benefit plans."
3
'
Generally speaking, covered "pension" plans provide retirement income to
employees or their dependents.32 ERISA defines an "employee welfare
benefit plan" more expansively to encompass a multitude of services
provided to current employees, including:
any plan, fund, or program... established or maintained by
an employer or by an employee organization... for the
purpose of providing... medical, surgical, or hospital care or
benefits, or benefits in the event of sickness, accident,
disability, death or unemployment, or vacation benefits,
apprenticeship or other training programs, or day care centers,
28. 29 U.S. § 1001 (1986).
29. Id.
30. Congress adopted ERISA as Pub. L. 93-406, Title I, § 2, Sept. 2, 1974,89 Stat. 832. In
common usage, ERISA has come to represent more than simply the statute itself. Instead, ERISA
includes a multitude of regulatory sources concerning pensions and welfare benefits, such as the
Department of Labor's rules, regulations, and letter rulings, the Internal Revenue Code and tax
opinions, and the expanding body of case law interpreting the many statutes, rules, and regulations.
These pieces together comprise "ERISA" for the purposes of the practicing lawyer, the human
resources manager, and, of course, the participants and beneficiaries under a particular plan.
31. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(3) (1974).
32. See id. § 1002(2)(A) ("Mhe terms 'employee pension benefit plan' and 'pension plan'
mean any plan... [that] (i) provides retirement income to employees, or (ii) results in a deferral
of income by employees for periods extending to the termination of covered employment or beyond.
... "). The two primary types of pensions are defined benefit plans and defined contribution plans.
Defined benefit plans involve an obligation to pay a certain monthly amount upon retirement.
Defined contribution plans involve an obligation to pay a certain amount each month into a fund
while the employee is employed. Upon retirement, the benefits in a defined contribution plan may
vary based upon market conditions, interest rates and'other factors.
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scholarship funds, or prepaid legal services.3"
Although subject to certain limitations and exclusions, 4 ERISA covers the
vast majority of employee benefits, including the important subset of
health care benefits.
Congress divided the statutory framework of ERISA into four titles.
Title One, captioned "Protection of Employee Benefit Rights," is the most
significant title and its regulatory provisions set out in Subtitle B consists
of seven Parts. Part 1 covers the reporting and disclosure requirements
applicable to all employee benefit plans.3" Part 2 covers participation and
vesting requirements for pension plans.36 Part 3 concerns funding
requirements for pension plans.37  Part 4 outlines the fiduciary
responsibilities of employee benefit plan administrators. 8 Part 5 sets out
the civil liability and enforcement provisions of ERISA.3 9 Part 6 addresses
continuation of benefits coverage under COBRA.40 Part 7 creates certain
group health plan portability, access, and renewability requirements.41
As Professor Peter J. Wiedenbeck has noted; one of the striking
anomalies of Title I of ERISA is that its regulatory framework can be seen
as a series of "conduct" and "content" provisions. The "conduct"
provisions relate to both pension and welfare plans, while the extensive set
of "content" provisions govern only pension plans.42 The distinction lies
in the fact that only pension benefits receive attention with respect to the
"content," or substance, of the plans themselves. ERISA directly regulates
the substance of pension plans by imposing certain funding, vesting, anti-
discrimination, and other content-based mandates. In contrast, at the time
of ERISA's enactment, welfare benefits principally were subject only to
"conduct" regulations. These regulations governed the behavior of plan
33. Id. § 1002(1) (1974). Even though broad, the entire class tends to share one common trait
distinct from pensions: these benefits tend to be in the nature of "services" provided to employees
throughout the course of employment, and perhaps through retirement, as opposed to pensions
which constitute post-employment monetary transfers.
34. ERISA explicitly exempts from coverage the benefit plans of state and federal
government agencies, religious organizations, workers compensation insurance plans, and non-
resident alien plans. 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b). Also, certain types of employeebenefits found within the
private sector are either excluded as well, such as dependent care reimbursement plans, see IRC §
129 (1981), or subject only to a limited part of ERISA's provisions, such as unfunded excess
benefit plans. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(36); id. § 1 101(a)(1).
35. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1031.
36. See id. §§ 1051-1061.
37. See id. §§ 1081-1086.
38. See id. §§ 1101-1114.
39. See id. §§ 1131-1147.
40. See id.§§ 1161-1169.
41. See id. §§ 1181-1191.
42. See PeterJ. Wiedenbeck, ERISA's Curious Coverage, 76 WASH.U.L.Q. 311,341 (1998).
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administrators procedurally such as by imposing reporting, disclosure and
fiduciary responsibilities, but they did not impose substantive requirements
concerning the contents of welfare benefit plans. While this dichotomy still
exists to a considerable extent, Congress, as discussed below,43 has shown
an increased willingness to regulate the substance of welfare benefits as
well.
ERISA also contains an express preemption clause. Section 514(a)
provides that ERISA "[supercedes] any and all State laws insofar as they
may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan."" This succinct
statement of Congressional intent, although seemingly simple and
straightforward, continues to confound the courts.
III. ERISA PREEMPuTON JURISPRUDENCE
A. The First Two Decades
For the first two decades following ERISA's enactment, the Supreme
Court interpreted the "relate to" language of § 514(a) literally to embrace
a broad scope of preemption. In various decisions, the Court described §
514(a) as having "a broad scope 45 and "expansive sweep, ' 46 and as
"broadly worded,"47 "deliberately expansive,"' and "conspicuous for its
breadth." 49
In its early decisions, the Supreme Court added texture to the sparse
"relate to" statutory language. The Court looked to the "broad common-
sense meaning" of that phrase concluding that "a state law may 'relate to'
a benefit plan, and thereby be preempted, even if the law is not specifically
designed to affect such plans, or the effect is only indirect."50 Similarly, the
Court has made it clear that even state laws that are consistent with ERISA
are preempted so long as they somehow relate to an employee benefit
plan." Consistent with these principles, the Court has ruled that a state law
"relates to" an ERISA plan if the law either: 1) has a "connection with," or
2) has a "reference to" an ERISA plan. 2
The lower courts have identified various factors to consider in applying
43. See infra notes 243-51 and accompanying text.
44. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a).
45. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724,739 (1985).
46. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 47 (1987).
47. Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 138 (1990).
48. Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 46.
49. FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 58 (1990).
50. Ingersoll-Rand, 498 U.S. at 139.
51. See Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 829 (1988);
Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 739.
52. Metropolitan Life,471 U.S. at 739; Shaw v. DeltaAirLines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85,97 (1983).
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these two prongs of the "relates to" test. The courts typically consult four
factors when determining whether a state law impermissibly "refers" to an
ERISA plan. As summarized by a recent Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
decision, these factors include: 1) whether the law imposes requirements
by expressly referring to ERISA plans; 2) whether the law expressly
exempts ERISA plans from an otherwise generally applicable statute; 3)
whether the law acts immediately or exclusively upon ERISA plans; and
4) whether the existence of an ERISA plan is essential to the law's
operation.53
The lower courts similarly look to various factors in determining
whether a given state law has an impermissible "connection with" an
ERISA plan. These factors include the following: 1) whether the law
regulates the types of benefits offered under an ERISA plan; 2) whether the
law requires the establishment of a separate benefit plan to comply with the
law; 3) whether the law imposes reporting, disclosure, funding or vesting
requirements; and 4) whether the law regulates ERISA relationships, such
as those between the plan and the employer, and, to the extent a plan is
involved, between the employer and the employee.54
Up until 1995, courts applied these principles to preempt a wide-range
of state laws and claims. The Supreme Court, for example, held that
ERISA preempted a wrongful discharge tort action in which an employee
claimed that his employer fired him to avoid making contributions to a
pension fund.55 The Supreme Court also ruled that ERISA preempted state
contract and tort claims alleging improper processing of a disability benefit
claim.5" ERISA preemption has been particularly noteworthy in the health
care setting, where courts have barred state law negligence claims relating
to the utilization review process, 57 as well as state health insurance
mandates and "pay-or-play" incentives.58
While recognizing a broad scope for ERISA preemption, the Supreme
Court has cautioned that some state laws may impact benefit plans in "too
tenuous, remote or peripheral a manner" to warrant preemption.5 9 The
Court also has read ERISA as tolerating state regulation of insurance
53. See Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. National Park Medical Ctr., 154 F.3d 812, 822 (8th
Cir. 1998).
54. See Operating Eng'rs Health & Welfare Trust Fund v. JWJ Contracting Co., 135 F.3d
671, 678 (9th Cir. 1998); Aloha Airlines, Inc. v. Ahue, 12 F.3d 1498, 1504 (9th Cir. 1993).
55. See Ingersoll-Rand Co., 498 U.S. at 140. For a general discussion of ERISA preemption
of state employment law claims, see Paul J. Zech, Federal Preemption andState Exclusive Remedy
Issues in Employment Litigation, 72 N.D. L. REV. 325 (1996).
56. See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 47 (1987).
57. See Kuhl v. Lincoln Nat'l Health Plan, 999 F.2d 298 (8th Cir. 1993); Corcoran v. United
Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1992).
58. See Standard Oil Co. v. Agsalud, 633 F.2d 760,765 (9th Cir. 1980).
59. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 100 n.21 (1983).
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW
contracts purchased to provide employee benefits, but not those provided
through self-insurance plans.60 The lower courts have had a difficult time
in determining the appropriate boundary of these limitations,61 and the
Supreme Court has signaled its frustration with the continual necessity of
revisiting its ERISA preemption jurisprudence.62  Meanwhile,
commentators have increasingly criticized the Court's broad interpretation
of the "relate to" standard as inconsistent with ERISA's regulatory silence
concerning the substance of welfare benefit plans.63
B. Four Recent Decisions
Beginning in 1995, the Supreme Court signaled a retreat of sorts from
its traditional broad approach to ERISA preemption. In four significant
decisions,' the Court has cast considerable doubt on the validity of its past
jurisprudence. The Court, in these decisions, has rejected a strictly literal
reading of ERISA's "relate to" preemption provision,6' and suggested the
60. ERISA contains a "savings clause" which preserves state laws that "regulate insurance,
banking or securities." 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A). The savings clause is qualified, in turn, by what
is known as the "deemer clause" which states that an employee benefit plan governed by ERISA
may not itself be deemed to be an insurer subject to the savings clause exception. 29 U.S.C. §
1144(b)(2)(B). The Supreme Court has interpreted these two clauses as providing for a different
scope of preemption with respect to plans that purchase insurance as opposed to self-insured plans.
For example, in Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724,746 (1985), the Court
held that ERISA did not preempt a state statute requiring that health care plans provide certain
minimum mental health care benefits to the extent that it applied to insurance contracts purchased
for ERISA plans. On the other hand, the Court explained that plans that are self-funded by
employers are exempt from the insurance exception by virtue of the deemer clause and are,
therefore, preempted by ERISA. See id. at 747; see also FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 65
(1990) (ruling that ERISA preempted a Pennsylvania anti-subrogation law as it applied to self-
insured plans, but not as applied to plans with purchased insurance).
61. See, e.g., AETNA Life Ins. Co. v. Borges, 869 F.2d 142, 145 (2d Cir. 1989) (observing
that "the distinction between state laws that 'relate to' employee benefit plans and those that have
only a 'tenuous, remote, or peripheral' impact is not always clear").
62. See DeBuono v. NYSA-ILA Med. & Clinical Servs. Fund, 520 U.S. 806, 809 (1997)
(where Justice Stevens begins his opinion by stating, "Ihis is another Employee Retirement Income
Security Act (ERISA) pre-emption case"); California Div. of Labor Stds. Enforcement v.
Dillingham Constr., N.A., Inc., 519 U.S. 316, 336 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating "I think
it would greatly assist our function of clarifying the law if we simply acknowledged that our first
take on this [ERISA] statute was wrong").
63. See infra notes 151-61 and accompanying text.
64. The Supreme Court actually has decided five ERISA preemption cases since 1995. The
most recent decision, Unum Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 526 U.S. 358 (1999), concerns a narrow issue
with regard to the insurance savings clause exception to preemption, see supra note 60 and
accompanying text, and does not address the broader preemption issue that is the subject of this
article.
65. See DeBuono, 520 U.S. at 812-13; New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue
Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 654-55 (1995).
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appropriateness of a somewhat narrower preemptive impact. In doing so,
however, the Court has failed to fashion a new, predictable test for
preemption. Indeed, these cases can be read as suggesting as many as six
alternate approaches to ERISA preemption.6 The following review of
these four decisions depicts the uncertain landscape that they have created.
1. Travelers
The Supreme Court first signaled its desire to reshape the scope of
ERISA preemption in New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue
Shield Plans v. Travelers Insurance Co.67 In that decision, the Court held
that ERISA did not preempt a New York statute that required hospitals to
collect surcharges from patients covered by commercial insurers or HMO's
while exempting patients insured by a Blue Cross/Blue Shield plan. 8
The Court began its analysis in Travelers by revisiting the meaning of
ERISA's "relate to" language. The Court noted that its prior attempts to
construe that phrase had provided little guidance in determining the proper
boundary line of ERISA preemption.69 The Court rejected a literal reading
of the statutory language, stating:
If "relate to" were taken to extend to the furthest stretch of its
indeterminacy, then for all practical purposes pre-emption
would never run its course, for "really, universally, relations
stop nowhere." H. James, Roderick Hudson, xli (New York
ed., World's Classics 1980). But that, of course, would be to
read Congress's words of limitation as mere sham, and to read
the presumption against pre-emption out of the law whenever
Congress speaks to the matter with generality.70
In determining whether this presumption has been overcome in applying
the "connection with" prong of ERISA preemption, the Court stated that
it must go beyond the "unhelpful" statutory text and "look instead to the
objectives of the ERISA statute as a guide to the scope of the state law that
Congress understood would survive.' 71
Applying this modified test, the Court in Travelers held that ERISA did
not preempt the health care surcharge at issue.72 The Court found that the
principal purpose of ERISA's preemption clause was to avoid a
66. See infra notes 149-50 and accompanying text.
67. 514 U.S. 645 (1995).
68. See id. at 649-51.
69. See id. at 655.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 656.
72. See id. at 668.
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multiplicity of regulation in order to permit the national, uniform
administration of benefit plans.73 While this purpose supports the
preemption of state laws that mandate plans to provide certain minimum
benefits,74 the Court distinguished state laws, such as the New York
surcharge, which merely have an "indirect economic influence" on ERISA
benefit plans.75 The Court concluded that such "an indirect influence...
does not bind plan administrators to any particular choice and thus function
as a regulation of an ERISA plan itself.' 76
2. DeBuono
Although not the next case in terms of chronological order, the Court's
decision in DeBuono v. NYSA-ILA Medical & Clinical Services Fund,'7 is
the only one of the remaining three decisions that fully adheres to the
principles announced in Travelers. In fact, the DeBuono case, decided by
the Court in 1997, closely resembles Travelers as to both facts and
reasoning.
At issue in DeBuono was a state tax imposed on gross receipts for
patient services at hospitals, residential care facilities, and diagnostic
treatment centers. The validity of the tax was challenged by the trustees
of a self-insured, multiemployer benefit plan who argued that the tax was
preempted as applied to facilities directly operated by an ERISA plan.79
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals agreed and distinguished Travelers
on the ground that the state tax in DeBuono directly reduced the plan's
assets." Thus, unlike the indirect economic influence of the Travelers'
surcharge, the Second Circuit concluded that the tax imposed by this
statute was preempted because of its immediate impact on an ERISA
plan's operation. 1
The Supreme Court, in reversing, admonished the court of appeals for
"failing to give proper weight to Travelers rejection of a strictly literal
73. See id. at 656-57.
74. See id. at 657.
75. Id. at 659.
76. Id. The Court's reasoning in this regard is questionable. The "indirect economic
influence' of the New York law acted as a tax on the decision not to have the type of open-
enrollment offered by Blue Cross &BlueShield. Open-enrollment addresses eligibility for benefits
under a plan or from a given insurer. Plan participation, however, is squarely within the purview
of ERISA. The New York laws, while on their face only impacting insurance prices and plan costs,
had the apparent purpose of financially coercing plans to accept open-enrollment. Therefore, state
regulation via the taxation of plans not offering open-enrollment may arguably be preempted.
77. 520 U.S. 806 (1997).
78. See id. at 809-10.
79. See id. at 810.
80. See id. at 811.
81. See NYSA-ILA Med. & Clinical Servs. Fund v. Axelrod, 74 F.3d 28,30 (2d Cir. 1996).
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reading of § 514(a)."82 While acknowledging that the statute's preemption
language is "clearly expansive,"8 3 the Court again stated that the text does
not modify the usual presumption against preemption. 4 The Court then
reiterated the modified test of Travelers:
In order to evaluate whether the normal presumption against
pre-emption has been overcome in a particular case, we
concluded [in Travelers] that we "must go beyond the
unhelpful text and the frustrating difficulty of defining its key
term, and look instead to the objectives of the ERISA statute
as a guide to the scope of the state law that Congress
understood would survive."85
Turning to the merits, the Court characterized the state tax as "one of a
'myriad state laws' of general applicability that impose some burdens on
the administration of ERISA plans but nevertheless do not 'relate to' them
within the meaning of the governing statute. 8 6 The Court pointed out that
the tax is not on ERISA plans per se, but on health care facilities, most of
which are not owned and operated directly by ERISA plans.87 The Court
concluded by stating that the fact that such a tax, whether directly or
indirectly imposed, has some financial impact on ERISA plans, "simply
cannot mean that every state law with such an effect is preempted by the
federal statute." 88
3. The Travelers/DeBuono Modified Test
The Travelers and DeBuono opinions clearly illustrate the Court's
desire to narrow its standard for finding ERISA preemption. These
decisions retain the traditional inquiry into whether the state law in
question has either a "reference to" or "connection with" an employee
benefit plan, 9 but appears to adjust this analytical framework through two
modifications.
First, the two decisions indicate that the preemption inquiry should be
grounded in the presumption that Congress generally does not intend to
preempt state law.' ° This presumption is rooted in part within the notion
82. DeBuono, 520 U.S. at 812-13.
83. Id. at 813.
84. See id.
85. Id. at 813-14.
86. Id. at 815.
87. See id. at 816.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 813; Travelers, 514 U.S. at 656.
90. See DeBuono, 520 U.S. at 813, 814; see also Travelers, 514 U.S. at 654 (holding "we
have never assumed lightly that Congress has derogated state regulation, but instead have addressed
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that "the historic police powers of the State include the regulation of
matters of health and safety."91 When a state acts within this zone of
traditional activity, the party seeking preemption bears a "considerable
burden" of overcoming the presumption of validity. 2
This new93 presumption appears simultaneously with the admonition
that courts should no longer give weight to the "unhelpful" text of section
514(a).94 Taken together with the anti-preemption presumption, this
adjustment in the Court's methodology effectively reverses the Court's
prior practice of presuming preemption. Under the Court's traditional
practice, ERISA's "relate to" standard resulted in the preemption of any
state law or claim impacting an employee benefit plan unless that impact
was too remote in nature.95 The modified test of Travelers and DeBuono,
in contrast, presumes the absence of preemption unless the challenging
party overcomes the considerable burden to prove otherwise. This reversed
presumption appears to signal a sharp reversal of prior precedent, and
brings into question the continuing validity of many of the Court's prior
preemption decisions.
Second, Travelers and DeBuono instruct that courts should look to the
"objectives" of ERISA as a guide to Congressional intentions on
preemption. 96 This step necessarily leads to a more narrow scope of
preemption. Rather than ousting all state laws and claims that relate in any
manner to an employee benefit plan, the modified test apparently will
tolerate state regulation that is not inconsistent with ERISA's objectives,
even if that regulation relates to a covered benefit plan. While this, at first
blush, may seem to be a logical, policy-oriented limitation on the
expansive "relate to" standard, divining the objectives of ERISA may
prove as difficult as the text of section 514(a). As an example, the
direct/indirect economic influence distinction that the Court made in
claims of pre-emption with the starting presumption that Congress does not intend to supplant state
law").
91. DeBuono, 520U.S. at 814; seealso Travelers, 514U.S. at655 (stating that historic police
powers of the state should not be superseded by a Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest
purpose of Congress).
92. DeBuono, 520 U.S. at 814.
93. Only one of the Court's earlier decisions had mentioned such a presumption, and did so
in dicta. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts Travelers Ins. Co., 471 U.S. 724, 740
(1985) ("We also must presume that Congress did not intend to pre-empt areas of traditional state
regulation."). Indeed, the Court in Travelers cited only to non-ERISA precedent as support for this
proposition. See 514 U.S. at 654-55 (citing Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725,746 (1981)).
94. See DeBuono, 520 U.S. at 813; Travelers, 514 U.S. at 656.
95. See Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 100 n.21 (1983).
96. DeBuono, 520 U.S. at 813-14; Travelers, 514 U.S. at 656.
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Travelers97 was discarded as irrelevant in DeBuono. The danger, of
course, is that the Court may be unleashing an ad hoe approach to
preemption analysis that may be even more unwieldy and unpredictable
than that which it replaces.
The modified test of Travelers and DeBuono, accordingly, does not
necessarily presage a smooth transition in the law of ERISA preemption.
This concern is heightened further by the fact that neither of the Court's
other two recent decisions fully adhere to this new standard.
4. Dillingham
The Court's decision in California Division of Labor Standards
Enforcement v. Dillingham Construction, N.A., Inc." was sandwiched
between those of Travelers and DeBuono. In Dillingham, the Court
considered whether ERISA preempted a state prevailing wage law as
applied to apprenticeship programs."0 The California law in question
"require[d] a contractor on a public works project to pay its workers the
prevailing wage in the project's locale."'' 1 The State, however, provided
an exception for approved apprenticeship programs."° The State sought to
enforce the statute against Dillingham Construction, a contractor that had
been paying its apprentices below the prevailing wage scale prior to
approval of its apprenticeship program."10 Because ERISA includes
apprenticeship programs within the definition of a covered welfare benefit
plan, O' the contractor argued that ERISA preempted enforcement of
California's prevailing wage law.
The Court rejected this argument and ruled that the prevailing wage law
had neither a reference to nor a connection with such a plan.0 5 The Court
found that the statute did not refer to covered benefit plans because an
approved apprenticeship plan could be structured as a non-ERISA plan.'0 6
As such, the Court noted, the statute "functions irrespective of... the
existence of an ERISA plan."'0 7 The Court also stated that since the state
law only operated as an economic incentive, as opposed to a direct
substantive mandate, it did not have an impermissible connection with
97. See Travelers, 514 U.S. at 659.
98. See DeBuono, 520 U.S. at 816.
99. 519 U.S. 316 (1997).
100. See id. at 319.
101. Id.
102. See id. at 319-20.
103. See id. at 321-23.
104. See id. at 323-24 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1)).
105. See id. at 324.
106. See id. at 325-28.
107. Id. at 328.
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ERISA plans.'0°
Dillingham is important in several respects. First, the Court in
Dillingham significantly restricted the "reference to" prong of ERISA
preemption in concluding that the state law did not refer to benefit plans
because of the theoretical possibility of its application to non-ERISA
plans."° This conclusion is surprising since most of the apprentice
programs that the State of California sought to regulate were ERISA
plans,110 including the plan at issue in the case.' The Court's reading of
the "reference to" prong could result in a large loophole enabling state
regulation of plans so long as the law is structured to encompass nonplan
subjects as well.1
Second, the Court specifically emphasized ERISA's silence with
respect to the substance of welfare benefit plans in considering whether
ERISA's objectives were sufficient to overcome the presumption against
preemption. In this regard, the Court stated:
ERISA certainly contemplated the pre-emption of substantial
areas of traditional state regulation. The wages to be paid on
public works projects and the substantive standards to be
applied to apprenticeship training programs are, however,
quite remote from the areas with which ERISA is expressly
concerned-"reporting, disclosure, fiduciary responsibility,
and the like."... A reading of § 514(a) resulting in the pre-
emption of traditional state-regulated substantive law in those
areas where ERISA has nothing to say would be
"unsettling."113
Thus, the Court, at least in this particular context, seems to agree with
those commentators who urge a more limited scope of preemption in light
of ERISA's regulatory silence.
Finally, and perhaps ultimately more important than the actual holding
of Dillingham, is the concurring opinion of Justice Scalia which urges the
Court to acknowledge that its "first take" on the scope of ERISA
preemption was wrong."' Justice Scalia criticized the majority opinion for
108. See id. at 330-34.
109. See id. at 328.
110. See id. at 327 n.5.
111. See id. at 322.
112. This approach appears to be contrary to some prior decisions which found preemption
with respect to state laws of general applicability even though the law also applied to entities not
covered by ERISA. See generally Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724,739
(1985); EMPLOYEE BENEmrrs LAW 548 (Steven J. Sacher et al., eds. (BNA 1991)).
113. Dillingham, 519 U.S. at 330 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
114. Id. at 336 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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attempting to reconcile the outcome in Dillingham with prior decisions of
the Court "instead of acknowledging that the criteria set forth in some of
them have in effect been abandoned."'' 5 The concurring opinion then urged
the adoption of a "field" preemption standard for ERISA preemption: "we
[should] acknowledge... that the 'relate to' clause of the pre-emption
provision is meant, not to set forth a test for pre-emption, but rather to
identify the field in which ordinaryfieldpre-emption applies-namely, the
field of laws regulating employee benefit plans [subject to ERISA]. ' ' n 6
Under this suggested approach, ERISA preemption apparently would
extend to the field of laws and claims regulating employee benefit plans
but not more broadly to encompass those additional laws and claims that
relate only indirectly to an employee benefit plan.
5. Boggs: An "Escape Hatch" from the
DeBuono/Travelers Test?
Of the four cases, the Court's decision in Boggs v. Boggs 17 is the most
difficult to reconcile with the others. Although issued on the same day as
a companion opinion with DeBuono, Boggs may represent a retreat from
the modified test of Travelers and DeBuono.
The Boggs case involved a dispute concerning a decedent's pension
benefits between the surviving sons of the decedent's first wife and the
decedent's second wife." 8 The benefits at issue included an annuity, an
interest in an Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP), and an Individual
Retirement Account (IRA) 1 9 As permitted by Louisiana community
property law, the first wife had transferred her interest in these benefits to
her sons by means of a testamentary instrument. 120 The second wife
challenged the validity of the testamentary transfer claiming that ERISA
preempted application of the Louisiana law.'2 ' She relied, in part, on
ERISA's requirement that a qualified joint and survivor annuity must
include an annuity payable to a surviving spouse unless the spouse has
consented to another arrangement. 22 ERISA, however, does not contain
any provision that would govern or otherwise impact testamentary transfers
of other types of pension benefits, such as an interest in an ESOP.12 The
Court held that ERISA preempted the operation of the sons' state law
115. Id. at 335 (Scalla, J., concurring).
116. Id. at 336 (Scalia, J., concurring).
117. 520 U.S. 833 (1997).
118. Seeid. at836.
119. See id.
120. See id. at 835-36.
121. See id. at 837.
122. See id. at 842 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1055(a), (c)(2)).
123. See id. at 847-48.
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claims based upon the testamentary transfers."
The Court began its analysis of the case by considering the state law
claim concerning the annuity benefits.'2s Unlike in its other recent
decisions, the Court did not begin its analysis in Boggs by invoking the
new presumption against preemption. To the contrary, the Court stated:
"Louisiana's community property laws, and the community property
regimes enacted in other States, implement policies and values lying within
the traditional domain of the States. These considerations inform our
preemption analysis."126 Markedly absent from Justice Kennedy's majority
opinion is any reference to the "considerable burden" that the decedent's
second wife, using the DeBuono standard, 27 would have to overcome in
order for ERISA to preempt her step-children's state law claims to the
retirement benefits. 128
The Court in Boggs, instead, set out the following analytical framework
for its deliberations:
ERISA's express pre-emption clause states that the Act "shall
supersede any and all state laws insofar as they may now or
hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan...." § 1144(a)
[ERISA § 514(a)]. We can begin, and in this case end, the
analysis by simply asking if state law conflicts with the
provisions of ERISA or operates to frustrate its objects. We
hold that there is a conflict, which suffices to resolve the case.
We need not inquire whether the statutory phrase "relate to"
provides further and additional support for the preemption
claim. Nor need we consider the applicability of field
pre-emption .... '129
Because of a direct clash between ERISA and state law with respect to the
distribution of annuity benefits, the Court held that ERISA preempted
Louisiana's community property law to the extent that it permitted the
testamentary transfer of the first wife's interest in the annuity. 30
The Boggs Court then addressed the disposition of the ESOP and the
IRA benefits. In contrast with survivor annuity property interests, ERISA
does not directly designate a participant's wife as a beneficiary to these
124. See id. at 854.
125. See id. at 839-41.
126. Id. at 840 (citing Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572,581 (1979)) (emphasis added).
127. See DeBuono, 520 U.S. at 814.
128. Indeed, only the dissent in Boggs raised the presumption issue ignored by the majority.
See Boggs, 520 U.S. at 861-62 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
129. Id. at 841 (emphasis added).
130. See id. at 844.
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types of retirement benefits.' 3' Therefore, the Court engaged in an
extensive overview of ERISA's other provisions governing the protection
of plan participants and beneficiaries. From its analysis, the Court noted:
The surviving spouse annuity and QDRO provisions, which
acknowledge and protect specific pension plan community
property interests, give rise to the strong implication that other
community property claims are not consistent with the
statutory scheme. ERISA's silence with respect to the right of
a nonparticipant spouse to control pension plan benefits by
testamentary transfer provides powerful support for the
conclusion that the right does not exist.'32
The Court, accordingly, also found the son's state law claims with respect
to the ESOP and IRA benefits to be preempted.
3 3
Interestingly, and to the converse of Dillingham,134 the Court in Boggs
relied on ERISA's regulatory silence to support a finding of preemption.
Silence, of course, faces a considerable burden in attempting to overcome
a presumption. Perhaps this explains the Court's reluctance to employ the
DeBuono presumption in Boggs.
The Boggs decision is curious for its departure from the
Travelers/DeBuono modified test. The departure may be nothing more than
a convenient way to justify a finding of preemption in the context of the
Boggs set of facts. On the other hand, the Court's opaque mode of analysis
may reflect a desire by the justices to keep their options open with respect
to the future direction of ERISA preemption.
C. Lower Court Response
Not surprisingly, the Supreme Court's lack of clarity has led to
considerable confusion at the lower court level. These courts
understandably are struggling to undo the "Gordian knot 135 of ERISA
preemption in the aftermath of these four decisions. The range of
uncertainty is illustrated by the divergent interpretations of the Ninth and
Eighth Circuits.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reads the four Supreme Court
131. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
132. Boggs, 520 U.S. at 847-48.
133. See id. at 852-53.
134. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
135. Prudential Ins. Co. v. National Park Med. Ctr., 154 F.3d 812, 818 (8th Cir. 1998)
(describing the appropriate standard for ERISA preemption as a mystery in the nature of the
"Gordian knot").
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decisions as adopting a new, "markedly narrowed" '136 approach to ERISA
preemption. In Emard v. Hughes Aircraft Co.,137 a Ninth Circuit panel
reviewed the four decisions and offered the following interpretation of the
Supreme Court's new standard: "Taken together, these recent cases
demonstrate, as Justice Scalia noted in his concurrence in Dillingham, that
the Court now applies 'ordinary field pre-emption, and, of course, ordinary
conflict pre-emption' analysis to ERISA preemption questions."' 38 Under
the Emard approach, ERISA does not oust state law unless the state
provision would conflict with a specific provision of ERISA,139 frustrate
ERISA's purposes, 140 or intrude into the field exclusively occupied by
ERISA.14 ' The Emard court further suggested that the field occupied by
ERISA is one narrowly confined to the regulation of plan administration
and the "rights of participants and beneficiaries as against the other plan
entities."' 42 This view of ERISA preemption clearly is quite restrictive and
one that will likely undo a considerable body of prior case law. 43
The Eighth Circuit of Appeals, in contrast, does not read the four
Supreme court decisions as affecting a "sea change"' " in the law of ERISA
preemption. In Prudential Insurance Co. v. National Park Medical
Center,45 the Eighth Circuit noted that these cases still retain the
traditional, two-prong analytical framework asking if a state law has an
impermissible "connection with" or a "reference to" an ERISA benefit
plan."4 Taking a measured view of the Supreme Court's apparent
adjustment of that framework, the Prudential court concluded that the
Supreme Court only refocused the preemption inquiry in the context of the
"connection with" prong, thereby leaving the "reference to" mode of
analysis unchanged.' 47 The Court went on to state, 'To put it another way,
we believe that the presumption that Congress does not intend to supplant
state law is necessarily overcome when the state law has an inappropriate
136. Toumajian v. Frailey, 135 F.3d 648, 654 n.3 (9th Cir. 1998).
137. 153 F.3d 949 (9th Cir. 1998).
138. Id. at 953.
139. See id. at 957.
140. See id.
141. See id. at 960-61.
142. Id. at 961.
143. This likelihood was expressly mentioned in another Ninth Circuit decision, Operating
Eng'rs Health & Welfare Trust Fund v. JWJ Contracting Co., 135 F.3d 671,678 (9th Cir. 1998)
(stating "If the breadth of federal pre-emption described in [prior precedents] were still good law,
Continental would probably prevail. However, these cases rely on expansive language from the
Supreme Court demonstrating an understanding of ERISA pre-emption that has since been tailored
to better fit Congress' policy intentions.").
144. Prudential Ins. Co. v. National Park Med. Ctr., 154 F.3d 812, 820 (8th Cir. 1998).
145. 154 F.3d 812 (8th Cir. 1998).
146. Id. at 820-21.
147. Id. at 822.
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'reference to' ERISA or ERISA plans, as such an improper reference is
defined in pre-Travelers precedent.""14 Thus, the Eighth Circuit views the
scope of ERISA preemption as only slightly modified from the traditional,
expansive approach.
IV. THE OPTIONS FOR A FUTURE ERISA
PREEMPTION STANDARD
A. Making a List
The Supreme Court, indeed, has many options from which to choose in
fashioning a future preemption standard. The following is a list of six
options, each of which is arguably viable based upon a reading of the
Court's four recent decisions:
1. The Modified Test of Travelers and DeBuono
The leading candidate is the new test set out in the Travelers and
DeBuono cases. This more restrictive reformulation of the "relate to"
standard has been expressly endorsed in two Supreme Court decisions.
Nonetheless, the Court's failure fully to follow the Travelers/DeBuono
formula in the other two recent cases suggests that the die is not yet cast.
2. Conflict Preemption
The Court in Boggs used a conflict preemption mode of analysis in
arriving at its finding of preemption. As the most narrow preemption
theory, the Court's adoption of this standard would be a radical departure
from its more traditional, expansive reading of the "relate to" language.
More likely, the Boggs majority simply used this "lowest common
denominator" of preemption as a means of resolving the case in question
without having to make any further pronouncements as to a future
standard.
3. Field Preemption
This is the standard championed by Justice Scalia in Dillingham and
employed by the Ninth Circuit in Emard. Although the Supreme Court has
not overtly adopted this approach in any of its decisions, the topic of field
preemption certainly was on the Court's mind in issuing Boggs. The Boggs
majority stated that it need not "consider the applicability of field pre-
emption," because of the ability to dispose of the case on a conflict
148. Id.
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preemption basis.1 49 The Boggs dissent, meanwhile, expressed the view
that the notion of field preemption is encompassed in the "connection
with" prong of ERISA preemption analysis."'0
4. The Prudential Compromise
The Eighth Circuit in Prudential interpreted the four Supreme Court
decisions as making a less radical adjustment to the traditional test. The
Prudential court concluded that Travelers' presumption against
preemption only modifies the "connection with" prong of the analytical
framework. This, according to the Eighth Circuit, would retain the
"reference to" inquiry under the traditional mode of analysis without
modification.
5. The Traditional "Relate to" Test
A return to the Court's traditionally expansive preemption standard may
be the least likely option given the Court's recent and repeated criticism of
that approach. Yet, by keeping its options open in Boggs, the Court retains
the possibility of returning to a test that would not put its past
jurisprudence in jeopardy.
6. A Differential Test for Pension
and Welfare Benefits
Three of the Court's recent cases involved state laws that arguably
related to welfare benefit plans. The Court ruled that ERISA did not
preempt any of these statutes. Only one case, Boggs, focused on the impact
of state law on pension benefits. The Court found that law to be preempted.
Perhaps these cases portend a differential standard in which ERISA will
more broadly preempt laws relating to pensions than those relating to
welfare benefits. This dichotomy, of course, mirrors ERISA's differential
treatment of pension and welfare benefit plans.
B. Critical Pressure for a More
Limited Scope of Preemption
The Supreme Court's apparent search for a less expansive test for
ERISA preemption finds support in the writings of numerous
commentators. These critics intone a familiar refrain-ERISA's regulatory
silence with respect to welfare benefit plans necessarily is inconsistent with
149. Boggs, 520 U.S. at 841.
150. Id. at 860 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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a broad scope of preemption.15 1 According to these commentators, the
Supreme Court should reduce the zone of preemption so as to enable the
states to fill the currently existing regulatory vacuum.
This argument is premised upon three related assertions. First, the
critics maintain that the legislative history surrounding ERISA's enactment
shows that Congress gave little thought to the meaning of the "relate to"
test in section 514(a).152 They point out that this language was substituted
for a less expansive field preemption provision only ten days before final
enactment. 153 One widely-cited article postulates that the broader
amendment resulted from lobbying by a few special interest groups seeking
to protect their turf and that the Congressional sponsors did not really grasp
the significance of this change. s4
Some commentators find further support for this line of argument in the
fact that the bill enacting ERISA also established a Joint Pension Task
Force charged with the responsibility of suggesting possible modifications
to section 514(a).155 Thus, they maintain that Congress intended the "relate
to" test to be only "provisional"15 6 or "experimental" in nature. 5 7
As a second assertion, some commentators argue that Congress also
gave little thought to the topic of welfare benefit plans in enacting ERISA.
They point to the fact that while ERISA contains significant substantive
regulation of pension plans, the statute is silent as to the required content
of welfare benefit plans. 58 Instead, ERISA only regulates the process-
oriented aspects of welfare benefit plans, such as fund reporting
requirements and fiduciary obligations.
Third, the combination of a broad scope of federal preemption with a
paucity of federal regulation results in a "regulatory vacuum" with respect
to welfare benefit plans."5 9 Viewing such a vacuum as rare and unwise, the
critics contend that Congress could not have intended such a result. At
151. See, e.g., Fisk, supra note 1, at 36-38; Stabile, supra note 5, at 48.
152. See Conison, supra note 5, at 622, 646-48; Fisk, supra note 1, at 52-56.
153. See, e.g., Fisk, supra note 1, at 53; Fox & Schaffer, supra note 5, at 49.
154. See Fox & Schaffer, supra note 5, at 48-52.
155. The creation of the Joint Pension Task Force is discussed infra at notes 192-97 and
accompanying text.
156. Fisk, supra note 5, at 54-55.
157. Conison, supra note 5, at 650-51.
158. See Fisk, supra note 1, at 36-37; Stabile, supra note 5, at 31-35; Wiedenbeck supra note
42, at 341-42.
159. See Fisk, supra note 1, at 37; Fox & Schaffer, supra note 5, at 48; Stabile, supra note 5,
at 35. Dana Muir describes this regulatory vacuum as the "black hole of ERISA." See Dana M.
Muir, Contemporary Social Policy Analysis and Employee Benefit Programs: Boomers, Benefits,
and Bargains, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1351, 1371 (1997). Professor Muir, however, offers a
somewhat different view as to the origins of this "black hole," stating that "it is not a necessary
consequence of comprehensive preemption. Instead, the federal substantive and remedial law, or
more accurately, the absence of federal substantive and remedial law, creates the vacuity." Id.
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least with respect to pension plans, ERISA's scheme of substantive
regulation provides some need to protect against potentially conflicting
state law. But such a need is absent in light of ERISA's regulatory silence
concerning welfare benefit plans. "5 In any event, the critics conclude, the
regulatory vacuum is bad policy in that it enables plans to operate at whim
without either federal or state substantive oversight.1
V. A RESPONSE TO THE CRITICS: REVISITING
EVIDENCE OF CONGRESSIONAL INTENT
This Section attempts to test the thesis summarized above by reviewing
various indicators of Congressional intent concerning the contemplated
scope of ERISA preemption. This task includes taking a look at legislative
history, the structure of ERISA, and the history of post-enactment
amendments. We believe that this review shows that the commentators
have overstated their claims and that Congress consciously adopted and
maintained a broad scope of federal preemption that is consistent with the
central purposes of the statute.
A. Legislative History
To understand ERISA's preemption structure, it is helpful to
understand the regulatory framework that preceded it. Aside from
provisions with the Internal Revenue Code governing the tax treatment of
employee benefits, Congress twice undertook measures to substantively
regulate employee benefits prior to ERISA's enactment in 1974. First, the
Taft-Hartley Act, adopted in 1947, began to regulate employee benefit
plans of employers with a unionized workforce by imposing various trust
and documentation requirements on certain benefits. 62 Second, in 1958,
Congress enacted the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act (WPPDA)
which included further content and conduct regulations concerning
employee benefits. 63
160. See Fisk, supra note 1, at 56 (stating that "[biroad preemption of state law may make
sense when Congress decides to regulate a field extensively, as it did with respect to pensions. But
broad preemption makes little sense when Congress does not extensively regulate in an area, as is
the case with nonpension benefits"); Stabile, supra note 5, at 35 (stating "[o]ddly, the cases do not
address the appropriateness of a different preemption standard for welfare rather than pension plans,
despite the fact that Congress' concern in passing ERISA was clearly with pension plans, not
welfare plans, and that ERISA provides substantive regulation only of the former").
161. See Ayling, supra note 7, at 407-08 (noting the lack of accountability by HMO's for poor
health care because of ERISA preemption); Fisk, supra note 1, at 38 (noting the "disastrous" effects
of ERISA preemption).
162. See 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5) (1947).
163. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 301-9 (1972). The WPPDA was repealed by ERISA. See Pub. L. No.
93-406, § 111(B)(2).
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These two acts took different paths in attempting to accommodate state
law. The Taft-Hartley Act contained the potential to preempt some aspects
of state law in relation to employee benefits. "4 The WPPDA, on the other
hand, expressly reserved the right of the states to regulate matters
involving employee benefit plans. 6 1
ERISA arose out of efforts to revise the WPPDA. 66 The House of
Representatives' first bill toward that end stated, "the provisions of this
Act shall supersede any and all laws of the States... insofar as they may
now or hereafter relate to the fiduciary, reporting, and disclosure
responsibilities of persons acting on behalf of benefit plans ... ""
Similarly, the Senate's first bill, denominated as the Retirement Income
Security for Employees Act, provided that "the provisions of this Act or
the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act shall supersede any and all
laws of the states.., insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to the
Subject matters regulated by this Act or the Welfare and Pension Plans
Disclosure Act. .. ' ,16' Both bills included an exception for state banking,
insurance, and securities laws.1 69
These early bills, accordingly, envisioned a field preemption
standard." As Senator Javits, another of ERISA's sponsors noted, the
earlier bills "defimed the perimeters of preemption in relation to the areas
regulated by the bill."171
ERISA, as enacted, however, contained broader language than any of
the earlier versions. Section 514(a), as we know, states that ERISA
"supercede[s] any and all State laws insofar as they may... relate to any
employee benefit plan."' 72 This language, which came out of the
conference committee, is admittedly a departure from the earlier bills.173
164. See generally Raymond Goetz, Regulation of UninsuredEmployee Welfare Plans Under
State Insurance Laws, 1967 Wis. L. REV. 319, 330.
165. See 29 U.S.C. § 309(b).
166. See generally H.R. Rep. No. 93-533, at 1 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639
(mentioning that the purpose behind the proposed bill was to revise the WPPDA).
167. H.R. 2,93d Cong., § 114 (1973), reprinted in Subcommittee on Labor of the Committee
on Labor and Public Welfare, I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE EMPLOYEE RETREMENT INCOME
SECURITY ACT OF 1974 50-51 (1976) [hereinafter "LEGISLATIVE HISTORY"].
168. S. 4, 93d Cong., § 602(a), reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY at 186.
169. See H.R. 2, 93d Cong. § 114(1973), reprintedin I LEGISLATIVEHISTORY, at 51; S. 4, 93d
Cong., § 602(b), reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY at 187.
170. One commentator has aptly described the earlier language as having "subject-specific
contours." Conison, supra note 5, at 619.
171. 120 CONG. REC. 29,942 (1974), reprinted in 1H LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, at 4770-71. One
commentator has suggested that "[t]hese penultimate versions were designed to preempt only what
was federally regulated, leaving states free to experiment in the employee benefit field where
ERISA stopped short." EMPLOYEE BENEFrTS LAW, supra note 112, at lxxxvii (introduction).
172. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a).
173. See Conison, supra note 5, at 620.
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This new language "was disclosed when the conference committee report
was filed ten days before Congress took final action on ERISA."'7 4
Why the departure from the earlier bills? Some clues are provided by
the comments of ERISA's legislative sponsors, contemporaneous
regulatory attempts by state and professional organizations, and the
creation by Congress of a Joint Pension Task Force.
1. Statements by ERISA's Legislative Sponsors
All three of ERISA's principal legislative proponents spoke in favor of
the expanded scope of preemption contained in the Conference Committee
Report. Senator Williams, Chairman of the Committee, noted, "with the
narrow exceptions specified in the bill, the substantive and enforcement
provisions.., are intended to preempt the field for Federal regulations." 5
The comments of Representative John Dent, another of ERISA's sponsors,
echo and expand upon those of Senator Williams:
Finally, I wish to make note of what is to many the crowning
achievement of this legislation, the reservation to Federal
authority [of] the sole power to regulate the field of employee
benefit plans. With the preemption of the field, we round out
the protection afforded participants by eliminating the threat
of conflicting and inconsistent State and local regulation.1 16
While both Williams' and Dent's comments speak of "field"
preemption, other comments describe the new language in more expansive
terms. Representative Dent, for example, depicted ERISA preemption as
"reaching any rule, regulation, practice or decision of any State," limited
only by "narrow exceptions specifically enumerated." 77 Senator Javits,
then ranking minority member of the Committee on Labor and Public
Welfare, stated that the new language was preferable because the prior,
more narrow
formulation raised the possibility of endless litigation over the
validity of State action that might impinge on Federal
regulation, as well as opening the door to multiple and
potentially conflicting State laws hastily contrived to deal
with some particular aspect of private welfare or pension
benefit plans not clearly connected to the Federal regulatory
174. Fox & Schaffer, supra note 5, at 49.
175. 120 CONG. REC. 29,933 (1974) (statement of Sen. Williams).
176. 120 CONG. REC. 29,197 (1974) (statement of Rep. Dent).
177. Id.
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scheme."'
In addition, Senators Javits and Williams both stated that the "relate to"
language was intended to apply in its "broadest sense.""7 9
These legislative comments warrant a number of significant
conclusions. First, the adoption of the "relate to" standard was neither
accidental nor a decision made with little thought. Instead, the comments
of these three sponsors illustrate that the new provision was an intentional
departure from the prior text. Second, the clear intent of this change was
to expand the scope of ERISA preemption. Although the new language is
sometimes described as embodying field preemption and sometimes in yet
more expansive terms, the statements of the sponsors, in either event,
indicated an intent to forge a standard that extends federal preemption in
its "broadest sense."18  Finally, these comments reveal the policy
considerations underlying the desired ouster of state law-Congress
wanted to protect both employers and plan participants from the obvious
burden of a myriad of potential state regulation.181
2. Contemporaneous Regulatory Initiatives
The potential for multiple layers of regulation clearly was evident to
Congress in 1974. At the same time that it was considering the bill that
would become ERISA, three non-federal entities were contemplating their
own regulation of various types of employee benefit plans. The very real
danger of multiple layers of regulation likely provided Congress with an
incentive to expand the preemptive reach of section 514(a).
Near the time that the Conference Committee was meeting, both
Missouri and New York were moving to regulate self-insured benefit
plans. 182 A self-insured plan is a type of welfare benefit plan by which an
employer, acting as the plan sponsor, provides benefits covered by its own
assets, rather than by contracting with a private insurer. 183 In an important
decision issued in 1974, the Missouri State Insurance Commissioner
successfully had argued in state court that such plans constituted
178. 120 CoNG. REc. 29,942 (1974) (statement of Sen. Javits).
179. Id.; 120 CONG. REC. 29,197 (1974) (statement of Sen. Williams).
180. 120 CONG. REc. 29,197 (1974).
181. The Supreme Court has recognized this Congressional intent in anumber ofits decisions.
See, e.g., Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 142 (1990) (holding that the goal of
514(a) was to reduce burdens caused by conflicting state regulations); Shaw v. Delta Air Lines,
Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 105 n.25 (1983) (stating that the purpose of preemption of state law was to
reduce the burden caused by complying with state laws).
182. See Fox & Schaffer, supra note 5, at 50.
183. See Mark A. Edwards, Protections for ERISA Self-Insured Employee Welfare Benefit
Plan Participants: New Possibilities for State Action in the Event of Plan Failure, 1997 WIS. L.
REV. 351, 352.
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"insurance" subject to Missouri's insurance laws.184 One year earlier, New
York had put forward a similar argument.'85
Also at this time, the American Bar Association was taking action to
limit the development of certain types of prepaid legal service plans."8 6 In
its 1974 annual meeting, the ABA amended the Model Code of
Professional Responsibility in a manner that inhibited the formation of
such plans. i 7
Congress clearly was concerned about these developments and took
action to preclude regulation supplemental to ERISA. Congress blocked
the possibility of the states regulating self-insured plans by the addition of
ERISA's "deemer" clause 88 which provides that benefit plans, by
themselves, may not be deemed to be insurance subject to state
regulation.8 9 Similarly, Congress amended ERISA to ensure that rules
promulgated by professional associations are subject to the same
preemption as state law."9°
These contemporaneous regulatory attempts, moreover, provided strong
contextual evidence of the need for broader preemption in general. While
the amendments noted above took surgical aim at their specific targets,
Congress may well have reacted against these events by expanding section
514(a)'s scope of preemption as a means of heading off future state
regulation as a whole. Senator William's comment that ERISA's specific
ban on professional association regulation is "consistent with [the]
principle" of the expanded "relate to" language lends some credence to this
explanation.' 9'
184. Missouri v. Monsanto Co., Case No. 259774 (St. Louis Co. Cir. Ct., Jan. 4, 1973). This
unreported decision was reversed in State v. Monsanto Co., 517 S.W.2d 129, 131-32 (Mo. 1974).
185. See Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. New York State Tax Comm'r, 298 N.E.2d 632, 636 (N.Y.
1973). Both the New York and Missouri courts of final appeal eventually went on to hold that the
laws of their respective states were inapplicable to self-insured plans, despite their regulators'
arguments to the contrary. See id.; Monsanto Co., 517 S.W.2d at 131-32.
186. See Conison, supra note 5, at 649.
187. See id.; see also Roland L. Young, House of Delegates Acts on Group Legal Services,
Shield Legislation, Court Organization Standards, and Uniform Divorce, 60 A.B.A. J. 446,446
(1974).
188. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A). Theinterplaybetween the "deemer"clause and the "insurance
savings" clause is discussed supra at note 60.
189. See Conison, supra note 5, at 649.
190. See Pfennigstorf & imball, Employee Legal Service Plans: Conflicts Between Federal
and State Regulation, AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 787, 829 (1976).
191. 120 CONG. REC. 29,933 (1974) (Statement of Sen. Williams). See also EMPLOYEE
BENEFTrsLAW, supra note 112, at5 ("he impact of this [Monsanto] decision was a key motivation
of Congress to include strong preemption rules in ERISA, largely precluding states from regulating
benefit plans."); Conison, supra note 5, at 649 ("the [Monsanto] decision may have further
demonstrated to legislators a more general need for broad preemption").
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3. Creation of the Task Force
As noted above, 192 the ERISA statute provided for the creation of a
Joint Pension Task Force. Congress charged this task force with the
responsibility for undertaking "a full study and review.., of the effects
and desirability of the Federal preemption of state and local law with
respect to matters relating to pension and similar plans."' 93 Some
commentators have argued that the presence of the task force suggests that
section 514(a) was designed only to be experimental and that Congress had
little idea what results the experiment would yield. 94
This argument is flawed in two salient respects. First, the resulting task
force report underscored the desirability of broad preemption. The task
force concluded that the "Federal interest and the need for national
uniformity are so great that the enforcement of a state regulation should be
precluded."' 95 Indeed, the task force recommended that the exceptions to
preemption set out in section 514(b) should "be narrowed still further."'196
Even more significantly, Congress has not acted to alter the expansive
"relate to" text. The experiment, as such, is now a quarter of a century old.
B. The Structure and Coverage of ERISA
Further evidence of Congressional intent may be ascertained from the
structure and coverage of ERISA itself. Advocates for a more narrow range
of preemption claim support from ERISA's differential treatment of
pension and welfare benefits. They contend that ERISA's silence as to the
substantive content of welfare benefit plans means that Congress gave little
thought to welfare plans in enacting ERISA and that the apparently broad
scope of the "relate to" standard should operate only in tandem with the
greater substantive regulation of pension plans.'9 While their observations
concerning the distinction in substantive regulation of pension and welfare
plans is accurate, we believe that the meaning to be gleaned from this fact
is not.
A brief overview of ERISA's statutory provisions show that Congress
devoted considerable attention to the regulation of welfare benefit plans.
Title I of ERISA is divided into two subtitles: Subtitle A and Subtitle B.
Subtitle A briefly contains basic introductory provisions such as
declarations of policy, definitions, and descriptions of coverage. The more
192. See supra notes 155-57 and accompanying text.
193. 29 U.S.C. § 1222(a)(5).
194. See Conison, supra note 5, at 650-51; Fisk, supra note 1, at 54-55.
195. House Comm. on Educ. & Labor, Activity Report, H.R. REP. No. 1785,94th Cong., 2d
Sess. 46-47 (1977).
196. Id.
197. See supra notes 158-61 and accompanying text.
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extensive provisions of Subtitle B contain numerous regulatory provisions.
To those who believe Congress unthinkingly included welfare benefits
within ERISA, the structure of Subtitle A's definitional section may come
as a surprise. Rather than immediately addressing pensions, ERISA first
provides an exhaustive definition of what constitutes a "welfare benefit
plan." '198 This provision is followed by the crucial definition of a covered
"employee benefit plan"' 99 in which Congress explicitly includes both
welfare and pension plans. These definitions provide the key for
understanding the intricacy of ERISA's framework.
Subtitle A also contains a section detailing the coverage of Title I. That
section explicitly provides that Title I in its entirety applies to "any
employee benefit plan" except as modified in the scope provisions of Parts
2, 3, and 4.200 By structuring coverage in this manner, Congress obviously
intended for Title I presumptively to apply to all covered benefit plans,
including welfare plans.
Subtitle B then sets out a litany of regulatory provisions divided into
seven Parts. Five of these Parts contain regulations applicable to welfare
benefit plans. Only Part 2, dealing with participant entitlement to pension
benefits, and Part 3, concerning the funding of defined pension benefit
plans, do not. This leaves welfare plans subject to a considerable breadth
of regulation applicable to such matters as information disclosure,2"'
fiduciary responsibilities,2°2 and enforcement procedures.2 3 Post-1974
amendments have added Parts 624 and 7205 which contain significant
substantive regulation concerning the continuation and portability of health
care benefits, perhaps the most important of all welfare benefits. More
recently, in the 1990s, Congress amended ERISA so as to require health
plans to provide coverage related to mental health benefits2 and breast
reconstructive surgery.2°7
ERISA's extensive regulation of welfare benefit plans belies the
argument that Congress was not really thinking about nonpension plans in
enacting ERISA. Congress thought a great deal about welfare plans, but in
a different way than it thought about pension plans. The provisions noted
198. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1).
199. Id. § 1002(2)(A).
200. Id. § 1003.
201. See id. §§ 1021-1031.
202. See id.§§ 1101-1114.
203. See id. §§ 1131-1147.
204. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1161-1169 (1986).
205. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1181-1191 (1996).
206. See Mental Health Parity Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-204, 110 Stat. 2944 (1996)
(codified as 29 U.S.C. § 1185a (1996) and 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-5 (1996)).
207. See Women's Health and Cancer Rights Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat.
2681 (1998) (codified as 29 U.S.C. § 1185b).
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above illustrate that Congress knew how to address those areas in which
it wanted to regulate welfare plans as well as how to create a regulatory
silence as to other aspects of such plans.
It is instructive to view the preemption language of section 514(a) in the
same light. Congress specifically extended the broad "relate to" language
to apply to both pension and welfare plans. This was hardly an accident.
Instead, Congress likely adopted the broad section 514(a) language for the
purpose of creating a regulatory silence in a different arena; that of state
law relating to all employee benefit plans.
C. Subsequent Amendments
Congress has amended section 514 no less than six times since 1974.
None of these amendments have had the effect of altering the general reach
of ERISA preemption.
In 1983, Congress granted a specific exemption to the State of Hawaii
to maintain its state health laws"8 which uniquely mandate nearly universal
health insurance coverage for Hawaiian residents.2' Significantly,
Congress rejected an earlier version of this bill which would have
eliminated ERISA preemption as to any state health insurance laws.210 The
Hawaii amendment was accompanied by a strong statement of negative
Congressional intent: "Nothing in [this amendment] shall be construed to
exempt [from preemption] any State tax law relating to employee benefit
plans. 211
The remaining five amendments generated three substantive exceptions
to preemption, all of which, like the Hawaii amendment, otherwise "related
to" state regulation of employee benefits. First, alongside the 1983 Hawaii
exemption, Congress also enacted a limited exception for state regulation
of multiple employer plans,212 which Congress revisited in 1989 with an
additional modification in language.2 3 Second, in 1984, Congress
208. See HAWAII REV. STAT. § 393 (1983).
209. See Pub. L. No. 97-473, § 301(a), 96 Stat. 2605, 2611 (1983) (codified as 29 U.S.C. §
1144(b)(5) (1974)). The exemption for the Hawaii Prepaid Health Care Act was apparently in
response to Standard Oil Co. v. Agsalud, 442 F. Supp. 695 (N.D. Cal. 1977), aff'd, 633 F.2d 760
(1980), aff'd, 545 U.S. 801 (1981) (holding that ERISA preempted Hawaii's mandates with respect
to self-insured plans).
210. See S.F. 1383,95th Cong. 1st Sess. (1977) (introduced by Sen Inouye (HI) on Apr. 26,
1977)). For a history of the struggle to secure an exemption for Hawaii's mandated health coverage
law, see Fox & Schaffer, supra note 5, at 54-59.
211. Pub. L. No. 97-473, § 301(b), 96 Stat. 2605, 2612 (1983) (codified as 29 U.S.C. §
1144(b)(5)(B) (1974)).
212. Pub. L. No. 97-473, § 302, 96 Stat. 2605, 2611 (1983) (codified as 29 U.S.C. §
1144(b)(6) (1974)).
213. See Pub. L. No. 101-239, § 7894, 103 Stat. 2441, 2451 (1989) (amending 29 U.S.C. §
1144(b)(6) (1974)).
FLORIDA L4W REVIEW
exempted state laws governing domestic relations orders from preemption,
provided that such orders were "qualified" within the meaning of
ERISA.214 In 1993, Congress further amended this provision to include
certain qualified child support orders. 215 Finally, in 1986, Congress enacted
an amendment granting states the power to mandate that employer-
sponsored health plans not include a provision requiring employees to
exhaust Medicaid benefits prior to claiming benefits under a health plan.216
While the Supreme Court generally has cautioned that "the views of a
subsequent Congress form a hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an
earlier one, 217 the history of these amendments depicts a succession of
Congresses that have adopted a consistent view of section 514(a). Through
these amendments, Congress illustrated that it knew how to change the
reach of ERISA preemption, yet did so only through relatively minor
adjustments that did not alter ERISA's general preemptive reach. These
amendments, moreover, are consistent with the recommendation of the
Task Force that the policies underlying ERISA require that "the
enforcement of a state regulation should be precluded. 2  Taken together,
this post-enactment history reveals that Congress has chosen to embrace
and retain a broad scope of ERISA preemption.
VI. WELFARE BENEFITS AND ERISA's
LIBERTARIAN ETHOS
The above review of the pertinent evidence fails to link Congressional
intent with a narrow scope of ERISA preemption. The legislative history
shows that Congress deliberately sought to expand the scope of preemption
beyond that described in earlier bills through the adoption of the "relate to"
text. Later Congresses repeatedly ratified that decision in post-enactment
amendments to section 514(a).
All that remains of the three-legged stool219 upon which the proponents
of narrow preemption base their arguments is ERISA's differential
regulation with respect to the substance of pension and welfare benefit
plans. According to these commentators, the lack of federal regulation
concerning the content of welfare benefit plans necessarily implies a lack
214. Pub. L. No. 98-397, § 104(b), 98 Stat. 1426, 1435 (codified as 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(7)
(1974)).
215. See Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 4301(c)(4)(A), 107 Stat. 371, 377 (1993) (codified as 29
U.S.C. § 1144(b)(7) (1974)).
216. See Pub. L. No. 99-272, § 9503(d)(1), 100 Stat. 82, 207 (1986) (codified as 29 U.S.C.
§ 1144(b)(8)).
217. United States v. Price, 361 U.S. 304,313 (1960).
218. House Comm. on Educ. & Labor, Activity Report, H.R. Rep. No. 1785,94th Cong., 2d
Sess. 46-47 (1977).
219. See supra notes 152-61 and accompanying text.
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of Congressional interest in preempting state law in this arena.22
We interpret the sounds of this Congressional silence differently. Given
the great attention that Congress gave to welfare plans in the structure and
design of the ERISA statute,221 it is more likely that Congress meant
exactly what it said in adopting the expansive "relate to" standard. By
deliberately pairing the silence of federal regulation with the silence of
state regulation flowing from a broad scope of ERISA preemption,
Congress intentionally created a regulatory vacuum that serves the central
objectives of ERISA's treatment of welfare benefit plans.
Comments by ERISA's legislative sponsors and the Supreme Court are
instructive in terms of ascertaining these objectives. At its most basic level,
of course ERISA preemption was designed to avoid potential conflicts
between federal and state law. As Senator Williams stated, section 514(a)
was drafted so as to ensure that employers would not face "conflicting or
inconsistent State and local regulation of employee benefit plans."222
Congress, however, sought to accomplish more than simply to trump
conflicting state law. Section 514(a) was intended to "reach any rule,
regulation, practice or decision of any State, ' 223 even where such state
regulation may be consistent with ERISA's requirements. 224 This broader
preemption scope was designed to create a uniform body of federal law
regulating employee benefits.' By preserving benefit regulation as the
exclusive domain of the federal government, Congress sought: "to
minimize the administrative and financial burden of complying with
conflicting directives among States or between States and the Federal
Government. Otherwise, the inefficiencies created could work to the
detriment of plan beneficiaries. 226 Thus, Congress sought to eliminate
state law from the arena of employee benefits in order to serve the interests
of both employers (plan sponsors) and employees (plan beneficiaries).
The Supreme Court, in Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., provided its most
detailed explanation of just how supplementary state law would burden
both employers and employees:
220. See supra notes 158-60 and accompanying text.
221. See supra notes 197-207 and accompanying text.
222. 120 CONG. REC. 29,933 (1974) (statement of Sen. Williams); see also 120 CONG. REC.
29,942 (1974) (statement ofSen. Javits) (explaining that thebroader language ofsection 514(a) was
designed to avoid "multiple and potentially conflicting State laws" that might impinge on the
federal scheme of regulation).
223. 120 CONG. REC. 29,197 (1974) (statement of Rep. Dent).
224. See Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 142 (1990); Fort Halifax Packing
Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 11 (1987); Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 105 n.25 (1983).
225. See Ingersoll-Rand, 498 U.S. at 142; Fort Halifax Packing Co., 482 U.S. at 11; Shaw,
463 U.S. at 105 n.25.
226. Ingersoll-Rand, 498 U.S. at 142; see also 120 Cong. Rec. 29,197 (1974) (statement of
Rep. Dent) ("[w]ith the preemption of the field, round out the protection afforded participants").
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An employer with employees in many States might find that
the most efficient way to provide benefits to those employees
is through a single employee benefit plan. Obligating the
employer to satisfy the varied and perhaps conflicting
requirements of particular state laws, as well as the
requirements of [federal law], would make administration of
a uniform nationwide plan more difficult. The employer
might choose to offer a number of plans, each tailored to the
laws of particular States; the inefficiency of such a system
presumably would be paid for by lowering benefit levels.227
The Shaw Court went on to describe the likely reaction of an employer
forced to comply with a myriad of federal and state regulation:
To offset the additional expenses, the employer presumably
would reduce wages or eliminate those benefits not required
by any State. Another means by which the employer could
retain its uniform nationwide plan would be by eliminating
classes of benefits that are subject to state requirements with
which the employer is unwilling to comply. ERISA's
comprehensive pre-emption of state law was meant to
minimize this sort of interference with the administration of
employee benefit plans.22
These statements reveal that Congress' desire for a uniform federal law
of employee benefits is designed to serve a yet higher objective-that of
encouraging employers to provide benefits to their employees. The Court
identified this goal more succinctly in its more recent FMC Corp. v.
Holliday29 decision: "To require plan providers to design their programs
in an environment of differing state regulations would complicate the
administration of nationwide plans, producing the inefficiencies that
employers might offset with decreased benefits. 230
Thus, by prohibiting state mandates, ERISA enhances employer
flexibility in structuring benefit plans. Large employers can structure a
single multi-state, or even nationwide, benefit plan. And, within such
plans, employers can experiment with innovative compensation
arrangements.
The purported incompatibility of pairing broad federal preemption with
little federal regulation disappears once this often overlooked objective of
encouraging the voluntary creation of benefit plans is understood. At the
227. Shaw, 463 U.S. at 105 n.25.
228. Id. (emphasis added).
229. 498 U.S. 52 (1990).
230. Id. at 60.
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time of ERISA's enactment, most welfare-type benefits were either
nonexistent or in their infancy.231 Congress understood the need to provide
broad incentives in order to create an atmosphere in which private
employers would be more likely to provide benefits, such as health
insurance coverage, to their employees. These incentives included a largely
regulation-free environment in which employer flexibility and
experimentation would be given free reign. This, then, is the heart of
ERISA's libertarian ethos: to create a vacuum, largely uniform in its lack
of either federal or state regulation, within which a multiplicity of welfare
benefits could evolve.
This objective perhaps may have been overlooked by many
commentators because it is not the usual goal of federal preemption. Courts
generally invoke federal preemption in order to preserve the integrity of a
scheme of federal regulation.z 2 Such a federal scheme, in turn, usually was
adopted in order to fix a perceived problem through substantive regulation.
ERISA's preemption of state pension laws is representative of this typical
pattern.233 Broad preemption in the welfare benefits arena is somewhat
unusual in that it takes the less well-traveled road of preserving an area
largely free of both federal and state regulation.
While ERISA's use of a broad preemption standard coupled with
relatively little substantive regulation may not be the norm, it is not unique.
A useful comparison in this regard may be drawn to federal labor law
preemption. The Supreme Court has recognized preemption under the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)234 in two separate circumstances.
The first strand of the NLRA, known as Garmon preemption, is the more
typical type of preemption in that it precludes state and local governments
from regulating conduct that is either arguably protected or prohibited by
the NLRA.23' Under the Second type of preemption, known as Machinists
preemption, a state or local government entity may not regulate conduct,
even if it is neither protected nor prohibited by the NLRA, if that conduct
is within the zone of activity that Congress meant to leave to the "free play
of economic forces.23 6
While ERISA's preemption of state law relating to pension plans may
be similar in purpose to that of Garmon preemption, its preemption of state
231. See Conison, supra note 5, at 621-22; Stabile, supra note 5, at 36-37.
232. See Befort, supra note 10, at 430.
233. See Stabile, supra note 5, at 31 (noting that Congress, in enacting ERISA's regulation of
pension plans, was seeking to rectify "abuse in the administration of pension funds and inadequate
funding of pension plans").
234. For a discussion of NLRA preemption generally, see Befort, supra note 10, at 430-34.
235. See San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 244-45 (1959).
236. International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Wisconsin Employment
Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132, 139-40 (1976).
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law relating to welfare plans is more similar to the objectives served by the
Machinists strand of labor law preemption. Congress, in both of the latter
contexts, sought to create a regulation-free zone in which the free play of
economic forces would not be disturbed."3 7
ERISA has been highly successful in its attempt to encourage the
development of employee benefit plans. In 1974, such plans were few, and
they played a limited economic and social role.238 That situation has
changed drastically over the past twenty-five years.23 9 Today, benefit plans
"are pervasive features of the business and economic landscape," 0 with
employee benefit transfers constituting approximately forty percent of total
payroll costs in the United States."' This dramatic growth certainly is due,
in part, to ERISA's libertarian ethos.
It should be noted that ERISA's preemption of state laws relating to
welfare plans serves a secondary Garmon-type purpose as well. That is,
ERISA' s broad scope of preemption preserves the welfare benefit arena for
future federal regulation as the need may arise. u2 In recent years, Congress
increasingly has enacted substantive regulation of welfare benefit plans.
Congress first added Part 6 to ERISA in the form of the Consolidated
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA). u 3 This Act
requires covered employers to offer continuing group health coverage to
terminating employees.2 " In 1996, Congress followed with the adoption
of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act.2' This Act
enhances the accessibility of employees to health insurance when changing
jobs by restricting limitations on coverage due to certain preexisting
conditions .1 6 More recently, Congress passed the first clearly "content"-
based 7 provisions concerning the extent to which health plans must
provide coverage for mental health care24 ' and breast reconstructive
surgery
249
Thus, ERISA preemption increasingly is serving two interests in a
237. See Machinists, 427 U.S. at 149-51.
238. See Conison, supra note 5, at 621-22; Stabile, supra note 5, at 36-37.
239. See Conison, supra note 5, at 622; Stabile, supra note 5, at 37.
240. Conison, supra note 5, at 622.
241. See MARK A. ROTHSTEIN & LANCE LIEBMAN, EMPLOYMENT LAW 455 (4th ed. 1998).
242. See Stabile, supra note 5, at 35 n.1 14.
243. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1161-1169 (1986).
244. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 1161(a).
245. Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified as 29 U.S.C. §§ 1181-1191 (1996)).
246. See id.
247. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
248. See Mental Health Parity Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-204, 110 Stat. 2944 (1996)
(codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1185a (1996) and 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-5 (1996)).
249. See Women's Health and Cancer Rights Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat.
2681 (1998) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1185b (1996)).
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manner similar to that of preemption under the NLRA-encouraging the
development of benefit plans through the free play of economic forces and
protecting a growing federal scheme of regulation. This secondary
objective of ERISA preemption is likely to increase in importance as
Congress continues to grapple with national health care reform issues.
President Clinton's 1993 health care legislative proposal, for example,
would have amended ERISA broadly by imposing substantive regulation
on health plans, including self-insured plans.' 0 While that legislation did
not pass, Congress, in 1999, has returned to the health care topic in
debating the adoption of a formal patients' bill of rights. 1 At this pace,
Congress likely will occupy the field of substantive welfare benefit plan
regulation more fully in the years to come.
Some commentators, noting the failure of federal health care initiatives,
argue for a narrower scope of ERISA preemption so as to enable health
care reform to proceed at the state level."2 This is a misguided notion.
Health care policy is a matter of national concern and should be addressed
by Congress, not by fifty states enacting conflicting health care mandates.
The most appropriate forum for the debate over health care and other
employee benefits is Congress, our most democratic national institution.
The Supreme Court should not divert this debate to the states by using
ERISA preemption as a proxy for health care reform.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's ERISA preemption jurisprudence is in disarray.
In four decisions since 1995, the Court has retreated from its traditional
broad reading of the statute's "relate to" text, but without clearly
delineating a new standard. The Court, although frustrated with the
vagaries of the statutory language, will have no choice but to revisit this
topic in the near future.
In doing so, the Court would be wise not to lose sight of the libertarian
ethos that underlies ERISA's treatment of welfare benefit plans. Congress,
in enacting ERISA, deliberately carved out an expansive zone largely free
of both federal and state regulation. It did so, at least in significant
measure, in order to encourage employers to create benefit plans for their
employees. This incentive plan has worked well and should not now be
abandoned.
What should this mean for the future of ERISA preemption? At a
250. See The White House Domestic Policy Council, THE PRESIDENT'S HEALTH SECURITY
PLAN: THE CLUTON BLUEPRINT 79-80 (1993).
251. See Peter Aronson, Congress Squares Off Over HMO Liability, NAT'L L.J., June 21,
1999, at A-I, A-10; Covington, supra note 7, at 22-30.
252. See Edwards, supra note 183, at 354.
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minimum, it means that the Court should not stand ERISA preemption on
its head by adopting a narrow test simply because of ERISA's regulatory
silence with respect to the substance of welfare benefit plans. A conflict-
based standard or one that treats welfare plans substantially different from
pension plans likely would unleash a torrent of state regulation and lead to
a diminution in the number and variety of welfare plans. Such a result
would also interfere with Congress' growing interest in establishing a
uniform body of federal substantive law governing employee benefits, in
general, and health care benefits, in particular.
Because of the difficulty of demarcating the outer boundary of what
"relates to" an employee benefit plan, we are sympathetic with the Court's
struggle to draw the line in a different manner. That line, however, should
retain a broad scope of preemption and provide some additional precision
to the analytical framework. The revised Travelers/DeBuono test appears
to be suspect in terms of both of these objectives. A preferable path may
lie in Justice Scalia's suggestion of a field preemption standard or in the
Eighth Circuit's relatively modest reformulation in Prudential. But
however the Court recasts its test for preemption, the new standard should
reflect and embody ERISA's libertarian ethos.
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